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Abstract  
 
The future of economic and social rights is unlikely to resemble its past. Neglected within the 
human rights movement, avoided by courts, and subsumed within a conception of development in 
which economic growth was considered a necessary (and, by some, sufficient) condition for rights 
fulfillment, economic and social rights enjoyed an uncertain status in international human rights 
law and in the public laws of most countries. Yet today, under conditions of immense poverty, 
insecurity, and social distress, the rights to education, health care, housing, social security, food, 
water, and sanitation are increasingly at the top of the human rights agenda. Economic and social 
rights are now present in most of the world’s constitutions, most of the main human rights 
covenants, and are often given an explicit justiciable status. At the same time, as different legal 
traditions and regions embrace this shift, their highly integrated economies face a profound 
reckoning with economic justice. The future cannot be predicted; but neither can it be ignored. 
This paper, introducing the book’s 21 chapters, incorporates a detailed examination of 
constitutions, courts and international mechanisms of accountability. These signal a transformation 




economic and social rights, democracy, courts, crisis, accountability, development, food, 
housing, health care, education, international human rights, constitutional law 
 
I.  Introduction 
The future of economic and social rights is unlikely to resemble its past. Neglected within the 
human rights movement, avoided by courts, and subsumed within a conception of development 
in which economic growth was considered a necessary (and, by some, sufficient) condition for 
rights fulfillment, economic and social rights enjoyed an uncertain status in international human 
rights law and in the public laws of most countries. Yet today, under conditions of immense 
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poverty and social distress, the rights to education, health care, housing, social security, food, 
water, and sanitation are increasingly at the top of the human rights agenda. A rights revolution – 
a juridical revolution – appears to be taking place. Economic and social rights are now present in 
most of the world’s constitutions, most of the main human rights covenants, and are often given 
an explicit justiciable status. At the same time, as different legal traditions and regions embrace 
this shift, their highly integrated economies face a profound reckoning with economic justice. 
The future cannot be predicted; but neither can it be ignored. 
 
Of course, periodization and prognosis are not for the timid. The normative demands upon which 
communities have long been held responsible – for neglecting the problems of hunger, illiteracy 
or ill-health, for instance – are sourced in many different historical periods and places, despite 
the later provenance of the discourse of ‘rights’. Yet if the twentieth century had marked a partial 
revival for social rights, as TH Marshall had argued,1 the twenty-first century may be instituting 
their juridical embrace. Marshall, a sociologist focusing on developments in Britain, saw civil 
and political rights as 18th and 19th century achievements respectively; writing after World War 
II, he viewed welfare state gains in education, housing, health care and social security as newly 
paradigmatic of citizenship. Such rights were understood as part of a broad institutional program 
of legislation and policy. But by the twenty-first century, these ideas had found a more explicit 
                                                 
1 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (with Tom Bottomore, Pluto, 1992, repr. 1949) p. 
17. 
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home – and purported safeguard – in law. By 2000, Albie Sachs would hazard a forecast that the 
21st century would see jurisprudence focused increasingly on economic and social rights.2 Rights 
to the material goods and services needed for a dignified existence would no longer be restricted 
to domains of statute or policy: such rights were to be judicially enforced. For Sachs, a former 
anti-apartheid activist, then South African Constitutional Court judge, such a development 
marked a departure from the 19th century, as the time of executive control over society, and the 
20th century, as the time of the legislature’s control over the executive: the new century would 
see the judiciary establish principles and norms controlling both. 
Underpinning these visions are contested assumptions about the rule of law and its power to 
constrain and control. From one vantage point, support for economic and social rights – 
sometimes referred to as socio-economic rights, or just social rights – is an elaboration on the 
idea of constitutionalism, often ascribed to the founders of the U.S. republic, that the authority 
and legitimacy of government rests on it observing certain constraints on power, prescribed in 
written text, and later fortified by judicial review. This view accords particular importance to a 
state’s duty to its own citizens, and those within its borders. From another, support for economic 
and social rights subscribes to the importance of internationalism, that the sovereignty of each 
state is encumbered by certain duties – to other states and to individuals. While the constitutional 
                                                 
2 Justice Albie Sachs, ‘Social and economic rights: Can they be made justiciable?’ (2001) 53 
SMU Law Review 1381, 1387 (presenting the ‘three generations’ theory of rights introduced in 
1977 by Karel Vasak, ‘Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give 
Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, UNESCO Courier 30:11 (Paris: 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, November 1977).  
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and international visions are separately sourced, and often separately debated, they share 
important premises that connect rights and duties through the institution of the state. Part of the 
task of this book is to connect such analysis, drawing on both comparative constitutional law and 
international human rights law. In particular, this book includes insights from law, political 
science, political philosophy, anthropology, political economy, and policy advocacy. It bridges 
institutional and doctrinal analysis and incorporates both normative and descriptive projects in 
economic and social rights research. 
This introductory chapter provides a background to the rise in juridical economic and social 
rights, and formulates three major puzzles that remain unsettled, described below, to which the 
book contributes important clarity: how the normative framework and legal institutions 
implicated by legal rights (particularly, courts) advance or obstruct democracy; how they address 
inequality and other concerns of distributive justice; and how they impact on the changing 
configurations of the state and market. A brief overview of the chapters follows. 
II. A Juridical Revolution 
Economic and social rights serve both as categories of ethical argument, and as categories of 
positive law. Each are, unsurprisingly, related to the other. Viewed as the former, economic and 
social rights occupy a central role in human rights thinking and action, belonging, like civil and 
political (and increasingly cultural and environmental) rights, within a sphere of articulated 
interests that are especially important to human freedom, equality, and dignity, and whose 
satisfaction is also susceptible to social influence. As Amartya Sen has demonstrated, the 
normative demands that correspond with economic and social rights may pre-exist, and may also 
 5 
transcend, the legal setting.3 Such claims may give rise to forms of agitation, persuasion and 
social monitoring that do not rely on positive law. Thus, they can be important for holding states 
accountable when they have not passed laws supportive of human rights, or have not ratified 
human rights treaties. The normative basis of such claims is one reliant on processes of public 
reasoning, in which, through critical discussion and scrutiny, they are grounded. (If, within 
politically and socially repressive regimes, such rights do not find support, the dismissal of such 
claims is itself not justified, as having not met the test of public reason.)4 
Nevertheless, enacted law – and arguments from custom made internal to law – can also provide 
moral support for moral obligations that go beyond the law.5 The jurisprudential view that sees 
the bindingness of law as heavily reliant on normative justification bridges the distance between 
the understanding of rights as ethics or law.6 This more encompassing perspective is particularly 
associated with the justificatory basis of constitutional law.7 Within international human rights 
                                                 
3 Amartya Sen, ‘The Global Status of Human Rights’ (2012) 27 American University 
International Law Review 1, 1–15. 
4 Amartya Sen, ‘Rights, Law and Language’ (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3, 437–
453, 441. 
 
5 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Thirteenth Annual Grotius Lecture Response: Amartya Sen’s Vision for 
Human Rights – and Why He Needs the Law’ (2012) 27 American University International Law 
Review 1 17–35. 
 
6 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986); see, e.g., Lawrence 
A. Alexander, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge and New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
7 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge and 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Katharine G. Young, Constituting 
Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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law, such justification may also be viewed as important;8moreover, features of ‘soft law’ and 
practices of persuasion and acculturation may also bring ethical and legal forms of argument 
closer together.9 
It is in this global setting, in which ethical demands are increasingly made in the language of 
human rights, in a diversity of institutional and cultural settings,10 that we find a corresponding 
rise in rights-prompted laws. And it is in this sense, that we might describe a juridical revolution 
in economic and social rights as taking place, with a surge in both enacted laws and in justiciable 
claims. 
Indeed, the juridical revolution in economic and social rights is more long-standing than even 
many of its advocates contend. In 1917, the Mexican Constitution was the first to supplement the 
famous U.S. federal model of a written bill of rights with express social rights guarantees – as 
had occurred with many state constitutions in the U.S. with respect to education guarantees. 
Later models adopted ‘non-justiciable’ formulations of economic and social rights – India’s post-
independence Constitution of 1950, adapting a legal formula from Ireland’s Constitution of 
                                                 
8 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 
9 E.g., Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through 
International Law(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
10 Sen endorses the view that words can be ‘signs of ideas’: Sen, ‘Rights, Laws and Language’, 
p. 445; an observation supported by evidence of the reach of the human rights into local justice-
based vernaculars: see Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law into Local Justice (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
 
 7 
1937, was to make such rights ‘directive principles of state policy’. A similar register of 
accountability had been established with the objective principle of the Sozialstaat, adopted in 
some parts of Europe (and beyond), that promised a ‘social’ rule of law, conferring legitimacy to 
redistributive state action, without necessarily giving rise to a subjective cause of action before 
the courts. After 1989, the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia retained 
certain constitutional economic and social rights; so, too, did newly reformed Latin American 
constitutions in their transition to democracy. The post-apartheid Constitution of South Africa 
included economic and social rights; these were confirmed by the Constitutional Court as 
justiciable in 1996. The latest wave of constitutional recognition has spread through Africa and 
the Middle East, and, to a lesser extent, parts of Asia. 
Such rights are now a common feature of the world’s constitutions, despite considerable 
variation in formal status and scope, thus joining and altering the ‘rights revolution’ observed 
elsewhere in law.11 In recent decades, there are clear, empirically tested, trends: the right to 
education, health, child protection and social security are now present in over two thirds of all 
national constitutions.12 Less widespread rights, such as to housing, food and water, development 
and land, are nevertheless increasingly part of new constitutions or constitutional amendments. 
                                                 
11 E.g. Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and Why We 
Need It More than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004) (expanding the previous lens of the 
‘rights revolution’). 
12 Evan Rosevear, Ran Hirschl & Courtney Jung, ‘Justiciable and Aspirational ESRs in National 
Constitutions’ (in this volume). 
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Twenty-first century constitutional reforms continue to entrench such rights, alongside civil and 
political rights. While the constitutions of the common law ‘West’ have been only partial players 
in this revolution,13 such rights are not foreign to sub-national constitutions and legislative 
guarantees there, as elsewhere.14  
A parallel revolution, more immediately visible, has occurred in international law. The dynamic 
is often the same – of objective guarantees of what is expected from states, hardening into 
subjective grounds for complaint. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed 
human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural as the ‘common standard of 
achievement’ for all peoples and all nations, in 1948.15 While its legal status was unusual – it 
constituted a form of promise without legal command, drafted by the United Nations Human 
                                                 
13 Ibid.; see also David Law & Mila Versteeg, ‘The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution’ (2012) 87 NYU Law Review 762-858. 
14 E.g., Malcolm Langford, ‘Judicial Politics and Social Rights’; Michael Rebell, ‘The Right to 
Education in the American State Courts’ (both in this volume); see also Emily Zackin, Looking 
for Rights in All The Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 
(Princeton, 2013) (all tracking U.S. state constitutions); see also, e.g., Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The 
Present Limits and Future Potential of European Social Constituitonalism’, (in this volume, 
noting significant legislative protections in Europe). 
15 Just as the Mexican Constitution signals a much earlier embrace in constitutional instruments, 
so too does the establishment of the International Labour Organization in 1919 in international 
terms. 
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Rights Commission and adopted by the General Assembly,16 its influence was widespread, 
including on new legal instruments and institutions.17 By 1966, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) was opened for signature, after its famous 
split from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, based on East/West and 
North/South disagreements. It entered into force in 1976, although it was not until 1985 that the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was established to monitor the treaty, now 
ratified by 168 states.18 These international trends have influenced, and been influenced by, 
domestic (and constitutional developments), in a complex migration of ideas between drafters, 
courts, policy experts and social movements.19 
                                                 
16 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001). 
17 For an influential assessment that the UDHR meets the standards of state practice and opinio 
juris that constitutes customary international law, see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, § 701, reporters’ note 2 (1987 (recently updated)). A number of other 
international legal mechanisms, from UN Special Rapporteurs to the Human Rights Council 
procedures of the Universal Peer Review, now monitor the rights of the UDHR, as do other UN 
and regional human rights instruments. 
18 Ratification numbers are available at http://indicators.ohchr.org (last accessed June 1, 2018). 
19 The extent of this two-way influence is controversial: compare Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg 
& Beth Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and 
Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 61-95 (finding causal 
 10 
These juridical revolutions are not merely textual in character – although their legal import is, of 
course, different. While constitutional developments have trended towards justiciability, this fact 
conceals a variety of legal forms. A major landmark was the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa’s decision on the right to housing in 2000, which was delivered at a time of renewed 
traffic in comparative constitutional ideas. A voluminous literature has since debated the pros 
and cons, and forms and limits, of judicial review, casting the more categorical debates against 
‘justiciability’ as ‘relics’ of another era.20 New constitutions and constitutional amendments 
increasingly adopt ‘justiciable’ versions of economic and social rights; certain national courts 
have been alert to new methods of scrutiny, and new remedial possibilities raised in complaints. 
Assessments of the advantages of ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ rights review have become homologous 
to earlier debates about ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ law at the international level. And indeed, in this 
                                                 
relationship between international human rights treaties and constitutions); with Law & 
Versteeg, ‘The Declining Influence’; see also Daniel M. Brinks, Varun Gauri & Kyle Shen, 
‘Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the Tension between the Universal and the 
Particular’, 11 (2015) Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 289-308. 
20 Mark V. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Many of this 
volume’s contributing authors have mapped out such debates elsewhere: see, e.g., Katharine G. 
Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Jeff 
King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Malcolm 
Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2009).  
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latter setting, where complaints are inevitably premised on ‘weak-form’ mechanisms of review, 
new complaints mechanisms have been established. And at the international level, the 
Committee now has authority to hear complaints against states who have ratified the 2008 
Optional Protocol. It delivered its first communication in 2010, again on the right to housing,21 
borrowing from methods of scrutiny used by regional human rights mechanisms and national 
courts.  
This global trend towards a juridical accountability is not, of course, simple convergence. The 
variation of economic and social rights stems from their content (more on this below), and 
depends many historical and contemporary political and economic factors. In legal terms, 
economic and social rights differ in terms of their interaction with, and support by, civil and 
political rights; the degree of incorporation of international and regional human rights law; and 
the rigor of judicial, other official, and civil society responsiveness. This variety is exposed, and 
examined, within the chapters that follow. 
III. Rights, Democracy and Adjudication  
Legalized economic and social rights have traditionally encountered seemingly insurmountable 
challenges for democracy. Yet new debates about rights and democracy are replacing the old. A 
long-standing trope in rights commentary has been to equate juridical accountability with an 
                                                 
21 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted on 10 December 2008 during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly by 
resolution A/RES/63/117, in force since 5 May 2013, UNTS No. 14531. There are now 23 State 
Parties to the Optional Protocol, and Spain was the subject of the first complaint. 
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anti-democratic rise in judicial power. To be sure, this criticism did not attach to legalized rights 
per se – Marshall’s legislative and policy vision for social rights was to enhance democracy, by 
securing an educated, and secure, voting community; a social democratic vision common to 
welfare state history and the conceptions of development that were addressed to concerns beyond 
merely economic growth. This democracy-based objection is better phrased in more narrow 
terms: that constitutional (or internationally binding) economic and social rights invite a form of 
judicial review (or treaty body scrutiny22) that can disenfranchise the political community on 
issues of deep, and perhaps unresolvable disagreement. In one succinct formulation, economic 
and social rights raise the twin fears of judicial usurpation of the elected branches, or abdication 
of the judicial role.23  
This democracy-based objection to rights attaches to constitutional civil and political rights,24 
too, but is intensified with respect to the powers of review and remedy conferred on judges by 
the relatively vague terms of economic and social rights, in which past constraining precedents 
                                                 
22 E.g., Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to 
Food, Water, Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law, 3, 462-
515. 
23 Frank I. Michelman, ‘The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification’ 
(2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 13. 
24 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 
1346–1406. 
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or interpretations have not accrued, and in which positive obligations invite resource-intensive, 
unpredictable, and multiple (polycentric) ramifications. Even so-called ‘aspirational’ rights (a 
better term might be ‘objective principles’) may fail to constrain judges from usurping the 
elected branches, due to the opportunity – or burden – to include economic and social concerns 
in the interpretation of other rights, such as the right to life, equality, or dignity.25 So stated, the 
democratic objection to economic and social rights has seemed overwhelming; yet the terms of 
the debate have changed significantly in recent years. In particular, the assumed models of 
adjudication have departed from the categorical, and ‘strong-form’ review exemplified by the 
U.S: ‘weaker-form’ review is open to forms of inter-branch dialogue and more thoroughgoing 
models of participation, as several chapters attest.26 More fundamentally, newer models of the 
separation of powers become more pertinent, as legislatures have become more associated with 
dysfunction, rather than democracy; and it is executives, rather than judiciaries, that are 
                                                 
25 Arghya Sengupta et al, ‘Legislating Human Rights – Experience of the Right to Education Act 
in India’, in this volume, note the well-known case of the Indian Supreme Court’s expansive 
interpretation of the right to life, including the right to education before the express constitutional 
amendment. Colleen M. Flood et al, ‘Canada’s Confounding Experience with Health Rights 
Litigation and the Search for a Silver Lining’, also in this volume, chart a different interpretive 
history by the Canadian Supreme Court’s purported refusal to include such concerns, with 
significant economic and social implications for health care provision. 
26 See, e.g., the contributions by Langford, as well as Sandra Liebenberg, ‘The Participatory 
Democratic Turn in South Africa’s Social Rights Jurisprudence’, and Roberto Gargarella, ‘Why 
Do We Care About Dialogue?’ to this volume. 
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overstepping traditional demarcations.27 A more attuned conception of democracy has also 
incorporated participation in international developments.28  
Evidence of new, democratically-responsive juridical trends come from constitutional and 
supreme courts in both the Global North and South. Courts in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, India and South Africa, for example, although responding to different political and 
economic conditions, are experimenting with new modes of review, providing scrutiny to aspects 
of decision-making formerly left untouched. The following chapters document how some courts 
now scrutinize, in the name of economic and social rights, the participatory processes of 
decision-making, the rationality of budgetary decision-making, the attention given to the needs 
of the most vulnerable, and whether less restrictive alternatives were considered. Courts are also 
redesigning remedies, by departing from individualized remediation to instead institute public 
hearings, meaningful negotiations, or other forms of deliberation. When successful, these models 
appear to catalyze more collective practices of accountability than would otherwise have been 
possible. Moreover, a rise in non-judicial accountability processes, such as in human rights 
                                                 
27 See, e.g, David Landau, ‘The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement’ (2012) 53 Harvard 
International Law Journal, 189-247, and the contribution by David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, 
‘Constitutional Non-Transformation: Socioeconomic Rights beyond the Poor’, in this volume.  
28 This viewpoint has been propounded by, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, ‘National 
Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law’ (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 59. 
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institutions or administrative commissioners, or legislative committees, now work alongside or 
apart from courts. 
Enforceable economic and social rights thus have the potential to be ‘mutually constitutive’ of 
democracy,29 connecting with a range of normative visions: deliberative democracy, 
participatory democracy, or more direct, experimentalist forms. These findings test the 
traditional assumptions about the ‘anti-democratic’ role of courts, and other forms of 
accountability. Of course, there are plenty of counter-examples: the judicial process favours  
individualized litigation and the award of non-systematic remedies, and tilts towards well-
resourced interests. It is a long-standing irony of legal rights that the legal process can be 
disempowering for rights-holders. Moreover, even the newer, more democratically responsive 
modes of judicial review, are accompanied by as-yet-unworked-out problems: ‘weaker’ forms of 
adjudication may test the historical guarantee of a strong, independent court, detracting from 
courts themselves as guardians of economic and social rights.30 
                                                 
29 Karl Klare, ‘Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights: Democracy and Separation 
of Powers’, in Helena Alviar Garcia, Karl Klare & Lucy A. Williams, Social and Economic 
Rights in Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2015), pp. 3, 4. 
30 Resnik presents the historical developments towards greater inclusivity, and independence, in 
this volume, that may now be under threat: Judith Resnik, ‘Courts and Economic and Social 
Rights/Courts as Social and Economic Rights’. 
 16 
And finally, against the backdrop of a recent and notably widespread erosion of constitutional 
democratic institutions, including of judicial independence, concern about the compatibility of 
rights with democracy is accompanied by alarm about the overall fragility of constitutional 
democracy.31 While concerns have long been expressed about the ‘tokenistic’ quality of 
economic and social rights and the tendencies of states to obscure rights infringements, by hiding 
behind ‘sham’ constitutional text or insincere treaty ratification, these concerns have ever greater 
force in our current global moment. As the following chapters suggest, it becomes important to 
inquire whether economic and social rights are at odds with the ‘engine’ of constitutional power, 
and/or have been understood to require only ameliorations in a system which is itself threatened 
by other constitutional structures or omissions, or are otherwise hostage to other regressive 
political developments.32 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Democracy 
in Crisis? (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
 
32 Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810–2010; David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, 
‘Sham Constitutions’, California Law Review 101 (2013): 863–952, 877; Ganesh Sitaraman, The 
Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our 
Republic (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017). The challenges of tokenism relate beyond 
economic and social rights to the particular issue of gender equality, as well as other rights: 
see Katharine G. Young, ‘Introduction: A Public Law of Gender?’, 
in Kim Rubenstein and Katharine G. Young(eds.), The Public Law of 
Gender (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 1–40, 3–6. For the inter-relation, 
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IV. Rights, Inequality and Distributive Justice 
Economic and social rights clearly implicate distributive, as well as political, justice. But as 
Jeremy Waldron has warned, economic and social rights have the danger of progressing, in 
advocacy and in jurisprudence, according to a ‘line-item’ method of justification – without a 
fuller sense as to how each right is realized in balance with other guarantees33 – or how, 
according to human rights doctrine, each are indivisible and interdependent with each other.34 A 
broader, if often highly abstract, account of distributive justice helps to settle ‘intra-rights’ trade-
offs, competing claims and compromises, and, we might add, the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable inequality.35 Taking a more general approach, the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                 
see, e.g., Audrey Guichon, Christien L. van den Anker and Irina Novikova (eds.), Women’s 
Social Rights and Entitlements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Daphne Baraz-Erez. 
‘Social Rights as Women’s Rights’, in DaphneBarak-Erez and Aeyal M. Gross (eds.), Exploring 
Social Rights: Theory and Practice (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart,2008), p. 387–408. 
 
33 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice’ (2011) 48 San Diego L. Rev. 
773, 779. 
34 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in relation to the right to development, adopted 
by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 and endorsed by General Assembly 
resolution 48/121 of 20 December 1993. 
35 Waldron, ‘Socioeconomic Rights’; see also Amartya Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315-356; Ronald Dworkin, ‘What Is Equality? 
Part I: Equality of Welfare’, (1981) 10 Philosophy & Public Affairs 185, 187. 
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Rights had recognized a right to an adequate standard of living: 36 new constitutional rights, by 
contrast, appear to ‘cluster’, appearing more frequently when related to human capital 
‘investments’ (education and health care, for example) versus what have been described as 
‘subsidies’ (food and water, for example), which set out a more explicit challenge to ‘efficient’ 
forms of market delivery.37 Labor rights, a historically integral feature of economic and social 
rights, are present in fewer than half of the world’s constitutions, and have not spread 
significantly in recent decades, while environmental rights, relative newcomers, have escalated. 
The right to health has trended towards increased entrenchment and justiciability, particularly 
since 2010. The right to housing, too, has become increasingly recognized in law; rights to 
sanitation, electricity, the internet, and public transportation, are increasingly the subject of 
human rights mobilization.  
Such developments, although often responsive to important demands, add a compartmentalized, 
and sometimes reactive, character to social and economic justice. The textual imbalance is, of 
course, compounded by litigation. The individualized structure of litigation tends to be distanced 
                                                 
36 This more general guarantee was nevertheless inflected with certain racial and gendered 
assumptions as to households: see, e.g., Katharine G. Young, ‘Freedom, Want, and Economic 
and Social Rights’, 24 (2009) Maryland Journal of International Law 182. 
37 Rosevear et al, in this volume, noting the parallels with this classification and the forms of 
spending endorsed by the IMF and World Bank during the Washington Consensus. 
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from settling broader questions of justice,38 and even collective actions are often funneled into 
discrete issue-areas, like securing school placements for discrete individuals rather than 
classroom conditions for all participants, or health care medications rather than the social 
determinants of health.39 While the participatory techniques described above can be inclusive of 
competing demands, there is plenty of evidence that the opposite is also true. In resource-
intensive areas, like health care or education, a successfully litigated claim can quickly absorb 
the available budget. These concerns become amplified in relation to the ‘middle-class bias’40 
observed in economic and social rights litigation: that is, that the poorest groups often fail to 
claim their rights, while the comparatively less disadvantaged, who are better equipped with 
resources, literacy, and information, can readily access the courts.  
A related criticism, levied at the international human rights movement, is that the discourse itself 
has done little to challenge escalating economic inequality. A critical history has recast human 
rights advocacy and constitutional reforms as complying too closely with market liberalization, 
                                                 
38 Varun Gauri and Daniel M Brinks, Courting Social Rights: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
39 See e.g., Sengupta et al (right to education); Flood et al (health patients’ rights), in this 
volume; for express examination of collectively drawn suits, see Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, 
‘Brazil: Are Collective Suits Harder to Enforce?’, in Malcolm Langford, Cesar Rodriguez-
Garavito & Julieta Rossi, Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of Compliance: Making It 
Stick, 177, 178 (Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
40 For an analysis of this problem, see chapters by Langford and Landau & Dixon, this volume. 
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privileging ‘status-based’ civil and political rights over economic and social rights, and, when 
agitating for the latter, attending only to sufficiency arguments rather than egalitarian concerns.41 
Certainly, the growth of the human rights movement has coincided with a set of neoliberal 
prescriptions that have resulted in increases in economic inequality in particular states, alongside 
decreases in poverty in some. 42 Many mainstream human rights NGOs, particularly those 
headquartered in the U.S., were slow to incorporate economic and social rights. Yet a broader 
history of human rights, which tracks efforts outside of the U.S., and which includes their 
influence on constitutional transformations, complicates this criticism. Oftentimes, advocacy and 
accountability efforts have targeted precisely these economic trends. For example, the 
international obligation to ‘progressively realize’ economic and social rights has been interpreted 
with economic inequality explicitly in mind.43 
                                                 
41 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2018). 
42 These trends are demonstrated by Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Arthur 
Goldhammer (trans.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); see also Branko Milanovic, 
Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2016). 
43 See contributions by Olivier De Schutter, ‘Public Budget Analysis for the Realization of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Uprimny et al, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Evolving 
Doctrine on ESCR and “Maximum Available Resources”’, and Katharine G. Young, ‘Waiting 
for Rights: Progressive Realization and Lost Time’, in this volume. 
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Moreover, the terms of these debates become significantly altered when income, or wealth, is not 
the only ‘space’ of equality-based concern.44 As the following chapters attest, different 
benchmarks of equality, such as of equality of opportunity, or status, as well as different theories 
of rights-based advocacy, demonstrate the connections, as well as the challenges, between 
equality goals and rights. A closer comparative analysis indicates how ‘universal’ versus 
‘targeted’ measures have proved more successful to the long-term protection of economic and 
social rights,45 and that ‘adequacy’ arguments have sometimes been more successful than 
exposing ‘equality’ concerns to the phenomenon of ‘levelling down’.46  These chapters lend far 
greater sophistication to the equality assessments that have earlier been offered in economic and 
social rights scholarship, which has juxtaposed poor and middle class beneficiaries as rivals in a 
zero-sum game; they are nevertheless complex arguments, that will prompt more empirical 
examination.   
V. Rights, the State and the Market 
Rights are inextricably linked, not only to legal processes and the articulation of justice-based 
concerns, but to the foundational elements of the state and the market. This connection is more 
complex than that offered by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1991, 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 
45 Langford, and Landau & Dixon’s contributions are notable in this regard; and the historical 
assessment of Jeff King, ‘The Future of Economic and Social Rights: Social Rights as Capstone’, 
in this volume, also adds much nuance to this debate. 
46 Rebell, in this volume. 
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when it declared that economic and social rights should be interpreted as neutral to the political 
and economic system adopted by a country.47 While that position should be understood against 
the backdrop of the large-scale ideologies of socialism and capitalism that had vied for 
dominance during the Cold War, a more nuanced analysis of political and economic organization 
is now underway, by commentators focused on the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and other regional and domestic rights guarantees. 48 Furthermore, the 
coming challenges of demographics, automation, and the sustainability of current methods of 
production and consumption, amongst other concerns, all demand more informed models of the 
stakes and pathways of economic and social rights realization within current systems of political 
economy.49 
                                                 
47 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 
8 (‘the Covenant is neutral and its principles cannot accurately be described as being predicated 
exclusively upon the need for, or the desirability of a socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, 
centrally planned, or laissez-faire economy, or upon any other particular approach.’) 
48 A good example is de Schutter, in this volume. See also the recent collection, Gillian 
MacNaughton and Diane Frey (eds), Economic and Social Rights in a Neoliberal World 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
49 Differing visions, not all of them consistent, are offered particularly by King, De Schutter, as 
well as Philip Alston, ‘Universal Basic Income as a Social Rights-Based Antidote to Growing 
Economic Insecurity’; Jeremy Perelman, ‘Human Rights, Investments and the Rights-ification of 
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Many of the chapters that follow demonstrate the basic legal realist point that the market is not 
independent from the state and its laws, but indeed is intrinsically structured by them. In this 
sense, the demarcation of economic and social rights as uniquely ‘positive’ in character is 
erroneous: all rights require state action, as well as state restraint, and economic and social rights 
create positive and negative duties.50 Even property rights are the product of laws and 
conventions: an insight elementary to the justice of taxation and redistribution.51 The analysis of 
economic and social rights thus requires a much more focused assessment of the state and the 
market, in all parts of the world. Several chapters in this volume deepen our understanding of 
this context. 52  For several decades, the social rights secured in the industrialized democracies 
have been in decline, as neoliberal policies have favored minimal regulation and provision, at the 
same time as tax policies have favored regressivity. While recent fiscal crises and austerity have 
                                                 
Development’ and Amy Cohen and Jason Jackson, ‘Rights as Logistics: Notes on the Right to 
Food and Food Retail Liberalization in India’, in this volume. 
50 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980); For the more total characterization of all rights as positive, as 
emanating from law, see Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty 
Depends on Taxes (W.W. Norton, 1999). 
51 The most compelling study of taxation remains Thomas Nagel & Liam Murphy, The Myth of 
Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002). For a recent exposure of this premise in intellectual 
property and its impact on essential medicines, see Amy Kapczynski, ‘The Cost of Price: Why 
and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism’ (2012) 59 UCLA Law Review. 
52 E.g., Parts IV and V.  
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focused attention on – and sometimes judicial pushback against – certain regressions, rising 
insecurity and diminishing services have been halted in only a few cases. Elsewhere, a mixed 
picture of ‘development’ is also on view. In some countries, constitutional reforms towards 
economic and social rights recognition have indeed resulted in innovations in interpretation and 
implementation, and have initiated new pressure upon the state in its regulation of markets. 
These have occurred predominantly in the middle income countries, as opposed to lower income 
countries, within the Global South.  
Rights are connected to state obligations, and are premised on a structure of accountability. In 
recent years, advocates of economic and social rights have contended more expressly with 
economic questions, by assessing the structures of budgets and resources – while acknowledging 
the potential for misunderstanding and unintended consequences.53 A growing number of 
lawyers and development economists have worked to create methodologies of accountability that 
review how many resources a state has at its disposal, against the outcomes for those within that 
community.54 Such methods now include a focus on issues traditionally thought outside the 
purview of rights-based review, such as how domestic revenues are appropriately mobilized, by 
trade tariffs, taxation, company royalty fees on those exploiting oil, gas, minerals, agriculture, 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Rory O’Connell, Aoife Nolan, Colin Harvey, Mira Dutschke & Eoin Rooney, 
Applying An International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations: Rights and 
Resources (London: Routledge, 2014) p. 200.  
54 E.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra-Eve Lawson Remer and Susan Randolph, Fulfilling Social 
and Economic Rights (New York, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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and other sources, and international sources of support.55 There are calls, too, for models of 
accountability to engage with the goals of sustainability and other limits on growth, when 
grappling with the earth’s changing climate and its consequences.56 And yet the formalization of 
accountability brings to the fore new debates – of how current models of accountability may 
privilege the formal versus informal sector; large-scale versus small-scale market participants; 
and status quo entitlements over new claims. These positions are debated in the chapters that 
follow, which are outlined briefly below. 
VI. Outline 
A. Part I. Adjudication and Rights: Global Trends 
In bringing textual empiricism to the analysis of economic and social rights, Evan Rosevear, Ran 
Hirschl and Courtney Jung describe the future of economic and social rights as, in part, 
constitutionally precommitted; and diverging regionally and by legal tradition. Drawing on an 
original dataset of 16 distinct economic and social rights in the text of nearly 200 national 
constitutions, they address some basic and important questions: how prevalent are constitutional 
economic and social rights; how prevalent are specific rights within this category; how often are 
economic and social rights made formally justiciable; and what accounts for the variation in the 
nature and scope of their protection. Their findings indicate that economic and social rights are 
overwhelmingly part of new and amended constitutions; certain rights have become standard, 
being present in over two thirds of all constitutions – including rights to education, health, child 
                                                 
55 De Schutter, this volume. 
56 Such calls are made, although not detailed, in Uprimny et al (see Chapter 20); see also King 
(Chapter 11) and Rosevear et al (chapter 2). 
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protection, and social security – and others remain relatively rare – including rights to housing, 
food and water, development, and land. Legal tradition – particularly civil law – and region – 
particularly Latin America and the former communist states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
– are strong predictors for the constitutionalization of economic and social rights.  
Building on past findings,57 their chapter analyzes a particular set of changes between 2000-
2016. This period, which corresponds to a series of constitutional amendments, particularly in 
the Global South, as well as new constitutions being promulgated in Africa and the Middle East, 
is matched by little change in the ‘Western’, particularly common law, constitutions, which 
continue to entrench few express economic and social rights. Some trends pertain to certain 
clusters of rights; nonetheless there is a clear equation of constitutionalization with 
judicialization, expressly conferring power on courts. 
This analysis of world trends in constitutional text is deepened and broadened by Malcolm 
Langford’s chapter on Judicial Politics and Social Rights, which provides a qualitative analysis 
of economic and social rights adjudication along the two measures of (1) judicial reflexivity and 
(2) distributive equality. First, judicial reflexivity is tested along a number of axes, reflecting 
influential accounts of courts and adjudication internal to law, political science and sociology. 
This framework introduces a new qualitative analysis for the long history of U.S. education 
                                                 
57 Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl, and Evan Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National 
Constitutions’ (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law, 4, 1043–1093. 
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rights,58 as well as a comprehensive cross-national survey. Classical archetypes, such as Ireland 
and Norway, appear to respond to legal culture; responsive archetypes, such as Colombia, Latvia 
and Nepal, entertain more strategic explanations, and still others, such as South Africa, respond 
to both. Furthermore, compelling plaintiffs (which argue against serious violations), well-framed 
legal arguments, judicial leadership and public opinion are all shown to influence the measure of 
judicial reflexivity. 
Second, distributive equality is tested against a detailed normative mapping of equality 
benchmarks, ranging from interventions sounding in radical equality, to weaker gains for the 
disadvantaged compared with the advantaged, which still reduce absolute poverty, or to 
diachronic equality measures that allow advantaged groups to benefit first, and yet lay the 
groundwork for disadvantaged groups to benefit later.59 Again, Langford indicates that the U.S. 
history of education rights present a narrowing of inequalities in particular states over time, with 
benefits accruing to low-income districts. And in his broader comparative survey, Lanford finds 
that Hungary, Brazil and India all complicate the simple picture of a single picture of pro-poor or 
middle-class bias. Although all jurisdictions have delivered strong judgments towards radical 
equality, so too are there variations over time, and by right.  
David Landau and Rosalind Dixon similarly analyze the results of adjudication of economic and 
social rights, and again examine the distributive impact on various groups, particularly the 
                                                 
58 These are also analysed by Rebell, in this volume. 
59 Landau & Dixon, in this volume. 
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poorest and most marginalized within a country, as against higher income groups. Again, this 
examination points to equality concerns, and helps to complexify the analysis of who benefits 
from such litigation, and how. Taking issue with the theoretical premise of transformation – that 
is, that enforced economic and social rights promote the interests of marginalized groups in 
poorer countries – they emphasize empirical findings that such rights are often interpreted and 
enforced on the behalf of higher-income groups that are not extremely poor.60 Yet rather than 
reject this oft-observed ‘middle class bias’ as normatively illegitimate or even perverse, Landau 
and Dixon examine certain bases for support.  
Landau and Dixon also engage with different accounts of judicial motivations and constraints, 
offering the case study of the Colombian Constitutional Court. This analysis leads them to 
suggest different interventions, on behalf of pro-poor claimants. These move from the more 
conventional call for different doctrinal devices, more generous standing rules, structural 
remedies, and more creative conceptions of role, to a greater appreciation for decisions made on 
behalf of non-marginalized plaintiffs, which are presented, not as middle class capture, but 
instead a majoritarian response by courts to widespread political failure. Finally, in noting the 
logic of welfare-state building, they suggest strategies of universalization, rather than targeting. 
Like Langford’s diachronic benchmark for equality, such results provide a more complex 
                                                 
60 A popular litmus test for transformative success has been a positive distributive impact for 
marginalized groups, e.g. Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo and Theunis Roux (eds.), Courts 
and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? 
(Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 
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assessment of resource allocation in democratic settings, even as they may dilute resources for 
the poor.  
B. Part II. Adjudication and Rights in Context: Two Contrasts  
The comparative viewpoint of global trends is contrasted with the close-up picture of two well-
documented jurisdictions, and the judicial enforcement of the right to education. Michael Rebell 
first examines the United States. Reiterating a theme introduced by Langford, the U.S. is 
characterized, not as the outlier usually recorded in measurements of national constitutional text 
or apex court litigation, but as a frontrunner of current litigation trends. Notwithstanding that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s famous refusal to declare education to be a fundamental interest under the 
U.S. Constitution, state courts have been involved in decades-long litigation and remedial 
follow-up: lawsuits have in fact occurred in 45 of the 50 states. Michael Rebell, a lead advocate 
for the Campaign for Educational Equity,61 examines the history of two waves of litigation.  
The first involved equal protection claims based on disparities in the level of educational 
funding; it required courts to evaluate expenditures, and had the result, in some cases, of 
‘levelling down’ funding for particular public schools. The second based plaintiffs’ claims on 
opportunities for educational adequacy – for a basic level of education– buttressed by specific 
state constitutional guarantees, and manageable standards. These, according to Rebell, have 
become reliably successful, with plaintiffs winning the majority of cases, and defendants 
                                                 
61 Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE) v. State of New York, available at: 
http://www.centerforeducationalequity.org (accessed 3 July 2018).   
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prevailing, when they do so, only on separation of powers grounds. The legal form of the right 
appears particular rigid – it is enforceable, not aspirational; it is affirmative, and yet cost is not a 
consideration; and if a violation is found, the remedy must be implemented promptly and on a 
large scale. While these assumptions do not always appear to bear out – some court orders have 
not been followed, in one telling example – they do make an impact, suggests Rebell, when the 
courts engage collaboratively with the executive and legislative branches. Such impacts are 
evidenced by data that confirm an increased state spending in lower income districts, decreased 
expenditure gaps between low-and high income districts, and some gains in educational 
achievement, as a result of such cases.  
This rather favorable account can be contrasted with the contribution by Arghya Sengupta, Ajey 
Sangai, Shruti Ambast and Akriti Gaur, who examine the Right to Education Act in India. 
Noting the historical evolution of the right to education in India’s legal system – from its 1990s 
recognition by the Supreme Court of India as part of the Constitution’s right to life guarantee in 
Article 21, followed by a constitutional amendment – the 86th amendment – introducing an 
express guarantee in 2002, and then, in 2009, follow-up legislation, the authors examine the 
latter’s history and impact. Sengupta et al, involved in an independent non-profit that assists 
governments in lawmaking,62 conclude that, for a number of reasons, this legislated right to a 
free, quality education for all has fallen short. 
                                                 
62 Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, available at: https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/about-us/ (accessed 3 
July 2018).   
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While Sengupta et al present an interesting dynamic of inter-branch and popular engagement, the 
details reveal shortcomings in how claims are made, registered, and remedied. In particular, there 
are evident gaps between the current legislation and previous Supreme Court authority on Article 
21. Some obligations are designated as ‘immediately realizable’ provisions and contain few 
positive obligations. Others are ‘progressively realizable’ and have seen little litigation or 
enforcement. The provisions which reach litigation are mainly ‘negative’, individualized 
complaints, which means systemic problems are left unaddressed. And while the Act is generous 
in setting up monitoring and enforcement mechanisms outside of the Court, the authors’ case 
study of Delhi reveals several points of ineffectiveness within this ‘non-judicial apparatus’. 
Indeed, the empirical analysis points to stark instances of very basic failures, again with a tilt, in 
the small instances of redress, towards individualized, non-systemic complaints.  
In both instances, the U.S. and Indian experiences complicate an easy story of the desirability or 
otherwise of law’s response to economic and social rights – whether through constitutional 
interpretation or amendment, sub-national (and thus more amendable) constitutions, legislation, 
judicial and non-judicial enforcement, litigation or other policy initiatives. The scholarship on 
economic and social rights has tended to view one point of failure as potentially redressable by 
another. Of course, the lessons are distinctive. The U.S. is notable for its continual reliance on 
local property taxes for school funding, which continue to reinforce highly unequal schools; 
India has attempted to addressed its legacies of inequality with the notable affirmative access 
provisions, which reserve 25% of school places, in both public and private schools, for 
economically weaker and disadvantaged groups. At the very least, it is instructive that economic 
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and social rights litigation has not disturbed these background rules in either case, in the 
informed view of education advocates who work in both litigation and policy domains. 
C. Part III. Adjudication and Rights: Democracy and Courts  
The following four chapters grapple more explicitly with the theme of economic and social rights 
and democracy, outlined above. First, Sandra Liebenberg contrasts the forms of contentious 
politics that have become prevalent in contemporary South Africa with a participatory, 
jurisprudential, alternative. In the former, service delivery protests have resulted in some 
institutional reforms, but also violent suppression and securitization of public institutions. In the 
latter, the Constitutional Court has introduced a doctrine of ‘meaningful engagement’, in order to 
measure both the ‘reasonableness’ of the state in addressing its economic and social rights 
guarantee, and to ground a remedy for implementation.63 In jurisprudence around housing and 
education, she finds a shift towards a more participatory democratic ethos of adjudication. This is 
not a large scale, inter-branch dialogue, as Liebenberg notes, but rather a dispute settlement 
paradigm for rights-holders, with some potential towards a broader-level engagement. 
Liebenberg argues that themes of participatory democracy are consistent with the pre-colonial 
history of South Africa, as well as the negotiated post-apartheid constitution. She suggests that 
meaningful engagement might trigger, enhance, and borrow from this culture, helping courts 
further their own legitimacy alongside the state’s accountability. And yet she raises at least three 
challenges: the inconsistencies of the Constitutional Court’s own jurisprudence, the inequalities 
                                                 
63 The broad doctrinal developments have been analysed in Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic 
Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd, 2010). 
 33 
that are reproduced in participatory models, and the deeper backdrop of claimants’ hostility to, 
and rejection of, the state. These challenges – that veer the country further towards contentious 
politics rather than deliberative democracy – are not the claimants to resolve: instead, Liebenberg 
argues persuasively for a more invigorated participatory turn on the part of South Africa’s courts. 
Roberto Gargarella revisits the South African doctrine of meaningful engagement, alongside 
Canada’s ‘notwithstanding clause’ and the public hearing processes instituted by various Latin 
American courts, to review the prospects and potentials of ‘dialogic constitutionalism’. These are 
cautiously approved of, by Gargarella and other critics of traditional judicial review, as 
deliberative practices, supervised by courts, which enhance inclusion and discussion in public 
decision making. Within such practices, courts no longer purport to issue the ‘last institutional 
word’ in constitutional adjudication, and no longer simply uphold or invalidate a statute; their 
processes of review are more involved in questions of public participation and access.  
These assumptions summarize, of course, a vast debate about the appropriate separation of 
powers in constitutional democracies. Yet Gargarella challenges the current versions of dialogue, 
now four decades old, as too little attentive to existing inequalities between participants, and too 
dependent on the discretionary will of public officers, and judges in particular. More specifically, 
Gargarella suggests that prevalent institutional systems tend to discourage rather than favor the 
kind of collective conversations that the theory of dialogic constitutionalism aims to promote. 
César Rodríguez-Garavito provides greater institutional detail on the theme of deliberative 
dialogue and its effect on economic and social rights realization. Introducing the components of 
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an ‘empowered participatory jurisprudence’, Rodríguez-Garavito bridges two prominent 
literatures on legal commentary on economic and social rights: those that address the normative 
questions of why courts should enforce economic and social rights, and those that examine the 
institutional details of how such processes should be orchestrated. The model therefore borrows, 
and builds upon, themes of deliberative democracy and democratic experimentalism. Under this 
model, courts act as catalysts of collective problem solving, while maintaining certain recourses 
to both substantive and procedural rights.  
Rodríguez-Garavito has written previously on the early litigation, adjudication, and monitoring 
of radical deprivation involving an ‘activist’ court:64 his case study here involves the ‘extreme 
case’ of the right to food in India, and the departures in strategy by social movements, litigants, 
courts, and court-appointed commissioners, media, aid agencies, and legislative and other 
officials, in the multi-decade right to food campaign. The campaign itself has been the subject of 
many studies since the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right to food, as derived from 
the constitutional right to life, in 2001, after petition by a group of civil society organizations. 
Based on a methodology of interviews with commissioners, reports and other material, 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., César Rodríguez-Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on 
Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) p. 14 (focusing on the Colombian Constitutional Court’s structural 
ruling, in T25 of 2004, which, after finding systematic failures of state action due to a massive 
forced displacement of millions of people: the Court maintained jurisdiction through 289 follow-
up decisions and 20 public hearings).  
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Rodríguez-Garavito finds evidence of many instances of an empowered participatory 
jurisprudence – including in the recognition of strong rights, moderate remedies, and significant 
experimentalist monitoring. 
It is helpful, within this general reimagining of courts’ democratic credentials, to be reminded by 
Judith Resnik of the incipient eighteenth and nineteenth century ambition, and egalitarian 
reinforcement, of exactly that potential. Resnik restates the availability of adjudication in rights-
based terms; involving aspects, not only of the traditional civil right (to courts of justice) 
categorized as negative in character, but of entitlements that states must affirmatively provide. 
The right to the court presented as an economic and social right expertly dissolves previous 
obligations, reasserting the indivisibility of rights with a refreshing new paradigm – and detail – 
to what it entails. 
Drawing on early U.S. history, Resnik notes the ‘open court’ and ‘right-to-remedy’ ideals, 
although marred by race, gender and class exclusions, evolved to meet egalitarian norms of 
access, in both civil and criminal spheres. Access to litigation came to be understood as the site 
for the state to treat all individuals with dignity, to allow opportunities for participation, and to 
ensure its own efficacy. Resnik’s earlier work had provided this contribution with a democratic 
justification:65 by committing public officers to forms of self-restraint and explanation, alongside 
providing equal and dignified treatment to all participants, trial-level litigation had deepened 
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democracy. These various roles portend obligations for the state, not only of continuing courts’ 
openness, publicity, and transparency, but of more obvious subsidy: that the court provide, to 
those unable to pay, fee waivers, counsel or experts; that courts consider cost factors when 
ordering bail and fines; and consider the special role of the state, not only in controlling access to 
divorce, but proper representation in bankruptcy and eviction cases. Clearly, adjudication cannot 
be taken for granted: it may be another ‘successful universal entitlement under stress’, with 
growing pressures on disputants towards settlement and arbitration: this takes up the theme of the 
next part. 
D. Part IV. Economic and Social Rights in Retrenchment: Past and Future 
Jeff King takes up the theme of retrenchment by pointing to the loss of many social protections 
in welfare states, a trend largely ignored, he argues, by those observing constitutional economic 
and social rights, who tend to take a legalist and narrow view. The current preoccupations of the 
economic and social rights field – what King suggests is the embrace of both liberalism and 
constitutionalism – has meant a focus on individuals and courts at the expense of the insights 
common to other disciplines. In order to challenge current preoccupations, King offers a 
‘capstone’ metaphor: that economic and social rights, as human or constitutional rights, are 
viewed as a final piece of a broader institutional structure, and the system of supporting values, 
that make enjoyment of rights a reality. This entails a fuller embrace of insights from welfare 
state studies: of the importance of collective action (unions as more promising than NGOs, for 
example), and a fuller recognition of the array of (progressive) tax, regulation and service 
provision for which the state should be responsible.  
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Nonetheless, King is careful to note that what worked in the ‘old’ world may not be a 
prescription for the new: welfare states trajectories are distinct from those of developing states, 
just as much variety exists within them. Indeed, insofar as ‘liberal’ welfare states have special 
weaknesses as against other types (especially in decommodification measures), King may be 
challenging a notion of ‘liberalism’ that has a distinct Anglo-American valence. Moreover, new 
challenges are unlike the old: climate change and demographics, immigration, fiscal crises and 
intra-welfare state competition all portend a troubling future. 
Like King, Colm O’Cinneide focuses on the implications of liberal constitutionalism, with a 
more explicit contrast between the Anglo-American and the European ‘social’ model. In Europe, 
the embrace of economic and social rights – primarily at the legislative level – is constitutionally 
regulated by a series of political, symbolic, and sometimes justiciable, commitments to social 
guarantees. As O’Cinneide claims, a full articulation of this mode of engagement serves to 
displace an apparently developing dichotomy between the sparse economic and social guarantees 
of Anglo-American constitutionalism and the full-swathe of justiciable economic and social 
rights protections in the Global South. Thus, the textual affirmation of the ‘social state’ 
(Sozialstaat) in many of the Constitutions of continental Europe, alongside other fundamental 
social rights or directive principles, contributes to a different understanding of legal 
effectiveness.  
This ‘objective norm of the constitutional order’ is undoubtedly meaningful, including in a legal 
sense. But its concrete contribution is, suggests O’Cinneide, elusive. Nonetheless, the financial 
crisis of 2008, and the introduction of austerity measures, have redirected political and legal 
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attention to the importance and meaning of social constitutionalism in different European states. 
From what O’Cinneide terms as ‘apertures’ – that is, openings of justiciability of social 
guarantees in various domestic systems – courts have reviewed austerity measures. Complaints 
have also increased at the supranational and international levels. And yet the results have been 
uneven – for different rights and different constituencies, with contributory pensions and public 
sector workers gaining greater access to courts than others. In this broad analysis, there are 
parallels with other trends towards litigation, but European constitutionalism remains distinct. 
Constitutional social guarantees had coincided with the ideologies and institutions of the welfare 
state. The increasing erosion of the safety net, rather than its transformation or development, may 
configure the role of social rights. 
The tension between liberal constitutionalism and economic and social rights becomes more 
explicit in the chapter by Colleen Flood, Bryan Thomas and David Rodriguez, who examine 
health rights litigation in Canada and its role in the dismantlement of certain aspects of universal 
health care. In particular, Flood et al observe not only the limited capacity of rights to serve as 
the ‘last line of defense’ gestured by O’Cinneide, but their use as direct tools to undermine 
previous redistributive and solidaristic gains. Indeed, their examination of Canada’s recent 
history of patient’s rights litigation against public wait times recalls King’s warning – that courts 
can defy the hard-won public-spirited programs of previous welfare state initiatives, by ushering 
in new opportunities for dismantlement and privatization.  
Flood et al examine the aftermath of a prominent case in 2005, where the Supreme Court 
declared Quebec’s prohibition on private health insurance to be an infringement of the right to 
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life and security of the person, in light of ‘unreasonable’ waits. The decision delivered a victory 
for a patient and physician plaintiffs, who had sought, not an individual remedy, but a more 
systematic authorization of privately funded care. In that sense, the decision secured by judicial 
means what years of physicians’ demands could not – hence its analogy to Lochner. Yet the 
consequences were blunted by a dialogic judgment and remedy: in Canada’s dialogic system of 
review, Quebec was given the ‘last word’, and responded with a canny plan for allowing patients 
to avail themselves of private insurance while removing the incentives for it. Nonetheless, Flood 
et al forecast that a ‘silver lining’ of reinvigorated reform is unlikely, in light of demographic and 
political realities, such as an aging, and increasingly unequal, population. The more general 
lessons for economic and social rights is ambiguous: whether this presents an indictment on 
constitutional review of liberal rights generally, or whether the negative tilt of the Charter – 
which include no express economic and social rights outside of equality, and no right to health 
care explicitly – is more at issue.  
In responding to increasing economic insecurity and rights retrenchment, Philip Alston engages 
with a different tac: the emerging policy proposal for a Universal Basic Income. Indeed, to name 
this as ‘policy’ both understates and overstates it: the idea of a basic income has a long heritage 
in distributive justice debates, including as far back as the sixteenth century, as Alston notes. 
And it the proposal has had limited uptake, even in their pilot form – Alston mentions small-
scale experiments in India, Finland and Kenya. Nonetheless, the proposal addresses important 
current challenges for economic and social rights, particularly in relation to growing economic 
insecurity and precariousness, and to new developments with which the future must contend, 
such as global supply chains and automation. 
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Alston, who engaged this proposal in a recent report as Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, 
has long called for engagement, by the human rights movement, with economic policy. Here, he 
contrasts the universal basic income proposal with a series of other schemes of social protection, 
including the negative income tax, global basic income, welfare state, cash transfers (both 
conditional and unconditional) and social protection floors. In particular, he suggests that all 
schemes be brought more critically in dialogue, and be enlivened to implications, not only for 
rights to an adequate standard of living, to social security, and to work, but also to the overall 
social protection framework. Universal basic income has engaged thinkers from both liberal-
egalitarian and libertarian traditions. The latter view it as a replacement of existing social 
protections and bureaucracies, and one that provides the moral permission for growing 
inequality, consumerism, and labour force retrenchment. The former view it, instead, as an 
important supplement. Alston suggests that rights advocates should become adept at selecting 
aspects of each, in the context of both developing and developed states.  
E. Part V: Economic and Social Rights in Development: Local and Global 
Turning to the development context more explicitly, Amy Cohen and Jason Jackson examine the 
right to food in India, situating the state’s obligations, not as Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito had 
done, with a focus on courts and participation, but with respect to a detailed analysis of markets. 
Markets, as they note, are central to the delivery of food. And in India, the passage of the Food 
Security Act 2013 coincided with the same government’s introduction, the preceding year, of a 
substantial program of market liberalization. Cohen and Jackson link these two events as part of 
what they term the same ‘modernizing ideology’ – of the insertion of formal, rule-bound, 
transparency into the food distribution system. They trace a parallel effort, on the part of both 
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right-to-food campaigners and retail liberalization proponents, to challenge the patronage-based 
networks of indigenous traders that had long defied centralized state control, and create in their 
stead more transparent, legible, and efficient supply chains governed by formal contract, and new 
systems of audit and accreditation. 
Such efforts have given legal economic and social rights traction and accountability. As evidence 
of this development, Cohen and Jackson note that both express Supreme Court directives, and 
non-court driven campaigns, have focused on the goal of transparency in food supply chains. Yet 
this goal, they suggest, diverts human rights claims to ‘logistics’: ‘the right product, in the right 
quantity and right quality, in the right place at the right time, for the right customer at the right 
cost’. Although Cohen and Jackson concede that right-to-food campaigners idea of ‘auditing’ 
and accountability is very different from those of retail-liberalization proponents (the one 
seeking community solutions, the other seeking capital-required technology, including 
sophisticated tracking algorithms and biometrics data), they provocatively suggest that they are 
two sides of the same coin. Both address, in part, the absence of trust in the public distribution 
system of food in India, as a result of years of corruption, patronage, and leakage. In this long 
history, Cohen and Jackson count, as one misstep, the replacement of universalist goals with 
targeting to the poor in 1997, the adverse consequences of which were the focus of the right to 
food movement. But the current focus on transparency and accountability tends to favor 
supermarkets over small-scale farmers and traders. In making this argument, Cohen and Jackson 
are therefore presenting much more complex an argument than that state obligations and market 
governance requires greater legal accountability. 
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Jeremy Perelman similarly explores the intersection of rights with practices of economic 
globalization and development, with a focus on foreign investment. Presenting the terminology 
of a ‘rights-ification’ of development, he points to an increasingly legalized field, whereby a 
formalist approach to law has developed alongside policy analysis. In this field, Perelman is 
critical of the ability of human rights to challenge the structural injustices of the contemporary 
global economy. Drawing on a large map of critical commentary, such as Third World 
Approaches to International Law and the critique of rights articulated by critical legal studies, 
Perelman predicts that the interventions offered by human rights, from the Human Rights Based 
Approach to Development (‘HRBA’) to more disruptive forms, will be limited in effect.  
Perelman situates his analysis in the growing political economy of natural resources extraction, 
where he documents the increased promotion and coordination of large-scale foreign 
investments. Despite an apparent departure from neoliberal development prescriptions, and the 
embrace of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals, Perelman finds only a continuum of 
extractive capitalism, with a tendency towards a regulatory race to the bottom rather than any 
countervailing move towards social and economic justice. In this evolving set of encounters 
between human rights and development, Perelman finds a ‘rights-ification of investment’ that 
tracks his general critique. New models of legal accountability have been introduced through 
practices such as human rights impact assessments (‘HRIAs’). These impact assessments borrow 
from other legal models of accountability to allow ‘affected communities’ (a problematic 
concept) to register their concerns, and perhaps be compensated. Nevertheless, Perelman 
suggests, these tools are readily coopted by powerful corporations, as forms of risk assessment 
which shore up private rights within global supply chains. Perelman’s critique extends through 
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the modes of social rights constitutionalism and international human rights mechanisms. In 
particular, he is wary of the participatory, and engagement-focused tools recommended by other 
authors, as currently practiced, with their tendency to depoliticize the broader effects of 
investments and to adopt narrow understandings of impact and consent. Nonetheless, he holds 
out the possibility that social movements and coalitions might substantiate these tools with 
broader, if pragmatic, political ambitions. 
Lucie White also engages a critical perspective in examining the present processes of human 
rights testimony, a ubiquitous tool of human rights practice. Such testimony, as she notes, can 
relate to different rhetorical projects: three prominent goals are to produce facts, to shame bad 
actors, and to give voice to lived experience. Yet these truth-seeking, strategic, and moral goals 
are not always consistent. A close analysis implicates, not only the practices familiar to the truth 
commissions and human rights tribunals that have been accorded prominence in recent decades, 
but also the broader practices of adjudication and dialogue that are the subject of other chapters. 
Drawing on critical legal and anthropological perspectives, White suggests that conventional 
human rights testimonies may miss the interconnections, incompleteness and mutuality between 
subjects and advocates and others, thus diminishing the potential for political empowerment. 
White draws on a case study of five texts of human rights testimony produced in an 
impoverished community in Accra, Ghana, finding them isolating in their political effect. 
Instead, she calls for a more collaborative, collective, and politicized, mode of testimony. For 
example, White recommends that testimony be polyvocal rather than dialogic, utilizing the first-
person plural. She also suggests that it should concern itself less with material facts than with 
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political power; less with clinical evaluation than with pragmatic strategizing; and less with 
naming and shaming than with what she describes as a more ongoing structural analysis. White 
hints at its contours with a short description of a group concerned about newly instituted oil 
extraction off the coast of Ghana, and its patient exploration of a collective response. 
There are parallels in the chapter by Kerry Ryan Chance, who brings an anthropological 
perspective to the study of economic and social rights, in examining ‘the informal, everyday 
practices that the urban poor use to construct, transform, and access’ their rights in contemporary 
South Africa. Drawing on ethnographic research of a community living on the outskirts of Cape 
Town, over a 12 year period between 2005 and 2013, she details the ways in which people have 
engaged in building shacks, occupying land, mobilizing street-based activities, and making 
claims in court, which all ground, in her terms, a ‘lawfare from below’. The lived experience of 
one person, in particular, helps to elucidate these practices: Chance recounts how Monique 
joined a protest against her eviction from the township of Delft, becoming part of a blockaded 
settlement which, for two years, resisted relocation to the transit camps administered by the state.  
It is thus in informal housing – particularly in the controlled ‘slums’ slated for ‘upgrading’ – that 
Chance finds such practices emerge. While she uses these terminologies with caution – noting 
informality can re-inscribe the colonial categories of the modern and traditional, or civilized and 
unruly – she provides a close and contextualized retelling of a freighted political struggle over 
the terms of the right to housing, and other post-apartheid laws, on the part of evictees. Here, 
Chance finds a grassroots politics which encompasses both contention and law. Indeed, she finds 
that within organized sites of occupation, it is an infrastructure and indeed a broader platform of 
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politics that is built. Chance’s efforts to understand, not simply the recourse to litigation, but the 
processes which give rise to it, help to frame a set of inquiries for the future of South Africa’s 
constitutional rights, as well as, perhaps, in other locales. 
F. Part VI. Measures of Accountability: Emerging Doctrines, Emerging Proposals 
The last Part engages with new proposals for accountability, developed at the international level, 
but in a notable continuum with previous chapters. Olivier De Schutter thus acknowledges, for 
example, the need to base the evaluation of states on democratic premises, informed by political 
economy and acknowledging the need for (disciplined) trade-offs between the interests 
representative of particular economic, social and cultural rights. But De Schutter, a present 
member of the Committee and former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, carries out a 
different task than previous chapters: engaging explicitly with present international human rights 
doctrines and methodologies to outline an updated toolkit for a ‘public budget analysis’ for such 
rights for the future. First, De Schutter engages the ‘novelty and subversive potential’ of states’ 
duties to progressively realize economic, social and cultural rights according to their maximum 
available resources: such possibilities accompany the principle that all states are responsible for 
the ‘minimum core’ or core obligations; that heightened responsibility is entailed when states 
retrogress from rights’ fulfilment; that states not discriminate against certain individuals or 
groups; and that states ensure participation in decision making.  
Second, De Schutter revisits the framework for assessing states’ decision-making and 
accountability for economic and social rights, by including a measure of how states mobilize 
resources, as well as how the promote certain outcomes and spending. Thus, for example, De 
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Schutter comments specifically on how states choose to exploit natural resources (including 
agriculture, alongside minerals, oil, and gas), and how they request international support. This 
assessment of royalties and investments builds on ‘right to development’ ideas, extraterritorial 
obligations, and development goals to highlight areas where accountability is now needed. In 
relation to taxation, De Schutter comments specifically on how states are in a position to expand 
their base, implement progressive tax policies and combat tax evasion. In relation to spending 
and budgets, De Schutter elaborates on three benchmarks: the social investment ratios introduced 
by the United Nations Development Program; the Achievement Possibility Frontier tailored to 
currently performing best practices among countries; and a diagnostic monitoring approach that 
introduces a new measure for causality in states’ budgets. This, combined with a critical 
acknowledgement of how baselines are assumed, and a critical connection with the values of 
civil and political rights, participation and democracy, suggests a far more complex role for 
economic accountability than was previously available. 
Rodrigo Uprimny, Sergio Chaparro and Andrés Castro Araújo translate many of the same 
frameworks in their analysis of the duty, on the part of State Parties to the ICESCR, to 
progressively realize economic, social and cultural rights ‘according to the maximum of its 
available resources’. Acknowledging a previous tendency to describe too absolute, or too 
discretionary a duty to fully realize economic and social rights, Uprimny, who is also a member 
of the Committee, and his fellow authors, analyze the ‘comparative assessments’ in which the 
Committee has engaged. Through synthesizing both General Comments and the responses to 
various states reports, the authors are able to present an in-depth picture of current doctrine, 
robust in its attention to the immediacy of state duties, non-retrogression, and self-reporting 
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strategies, and in seeking to forge responses to such difficulties as how to measure ‘available 
resources’ or how to conceptualize the impact of corruption.  
Emerging in this picture is significant technical and methodological advance. In particular, 
Uprimny et al document several presumptions of non-compliance that orient the Committee’s 
work, which is triggered when there is evidence of: stagnant public expenditure, problematic and 
ongoing disparities; strong and prolonged growth without resource allocation; discriminating and 
insufficient tax policy; high levels of economic inequality; and measures that may sound in 
extraterritorial obligations, such as those that support financial secrecy, which might sustain 
illicit financial flows. All these issues indicate how a large and enhanced ‘fiscal repertoire’ are 
part of the Committee’s activities. But these innovations are not, stress the authors, purely 
technical in character. Indeed, the presumptions of non-compliance often trigger, not only the 
types of burden of proof reversals familiar to courts and tribunals, but also processes of dialogue, 
much like the accountability models considered in Part III of this book. 
In concluding the volume, Katharine Young engages conceptually with the promise of economic 
and social rights, as one subject to ‘progressive realization’. This conditioned obligation, 
appearing in the international treaty, has been replicated in some constitutions, and sets out a 
novel understanding of how duties to realize rights must proceed. Noting that delay of rights is 
akin to denial of rights, Young explores the various ways in which accountability models, at the 
international level, have elaborated on concrete, and temporal, benchmarks. These include the 
minimum core, and non-retrogression doctrines, and the exercises in comparative rankings. 
These are important compromises, especially for positive obligations, and yet they risk too 
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indefinite a postponement for the satisfaction of certain important interests that are represented 
by ‘rights’. 
With the promise of rights, law structures the expectations of rights-holders: in order to 
understand how this occurs, Young turns to the experience of waiting, as possibly counteractive 
to the promise of rights. This provides greater insight on the critical tension between the need to 
recognize that some rights may be unfeasible in the short term, and yet should not lose their 
status as an interest of special concern, on the one hand; and the need to acknowledge that 
permitting delay in fulfilment may be unlikely to bring about the agitations and mobilizations 
necessary for rights to be recognized and materialized, on the other. Waiting for rights may be an 
especially passive, disempowering, and anti-solidaristic experience.  
The chapters end, then, with a series of challenges for how economic and social rights, as a 
discourse of social justice, a component of constitutional protection, and a central feature of 
international human rights law, will unfold. 
